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WHEN CONSTITUTIONS COLLIDE: A STUDY IN 
FEDERALISM IN THE CRIMINAL LAW CONTEXT 
Michael R. Braudest 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Most of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States that 
apply to criminal cases have cognate provisions in the constitutions of 
the various states - provisions that create the same right or restriction. 
Often the language of the state provisions is quite similar to that of the 
parallel federal provision. When the Supreme Court of the United States 
interprets a provision of the federal charter in a manner that conflicts 
with state precedent, and a subsequent similar case in a state court brings 
into question the proper construction of the cognate provision of the 
state's constitution, the state court will be confronted with a choice be-
tween following the holding of the Supreme Court or construing the state 
constitution independently. This article explores how the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland has resolved this dilemma, and compares its approach 
with that taken by courts in other states. 
The following chart sets forth important provisions of the Bill of 
Rights of the United States Constitution and the Declaration of Rights of 
the Maryland Constitution as they relate to criminal cases: 
Substantive Right 
or Restriction 
Right to Counsel 
Privilege against 
Self-incrimination 
Provision of 
Maryland 
Declaration of 
Rights 
Article 21: That in 
all criminal 
prosecutions, every 
man hath a right 
... to be allowed 
counsel .... 
Article 22: That 
no man ought to 
be compelled to 
give evidence 
against himself in 
criminal cases. 
Provision of United 
States Constitution 
Amendment VI: In all 
criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense. 
Amendment V: No 
person . . . shall be 
compelled in any 
criminal case to be a 
witness against himself 
t B.A., 1975, The Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1978, University of Chicago Law 
School; Assistant Public Defender, Appellate Division, Office of the Public De-
fender, Baltimore, Maryland. 
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not neces-
sarily reflect the opinions of the Office of the Public Defender of Maryland, or any 
of its employees. 
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Due Process 
Searches and 
Seizures 
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Article 24: That 
no man ought to 
be taken or 
imprisoned or 
disseized of his 
free-hold, liberties 
or privileges, or 
outlawed, or 
exiled, or, in any 
manner, destroyed, 
or deprived of his 
life, liberty or 
property, but by 
the judgment of 
· his peers, or by the 
Law of the land. 1 
Article 26: That 
all warrants, 
without oath or 
affirmation, to 
search suspected 
places, or to seize 
any person or 
property, are 
grievous and 
oppressive; and all 
general warrants to 
search suspected 
places, or to 
apprehend 
suspected persons, 
without naming or 
describing the 
place, or the 
person in special, 
are illegal, and 
ought not to be 
granted. 
Amendment V: No 
person shall be . . . 
deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without 
due process of law; 
Amendment IV: The 
right of the people to 
be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against 
unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable . 
cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation and 
particularly describing 
the place to be 
searched, and the 
persons or things to be 
seized. 
1. Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is captioned "Due Process," and 
the due process concept has long been equated with "the law of the land" under that 
article. See Wright v. Wright, 2 Md. 429, 452 (1852). 
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Trial by Jury 
and Speedy Trial 
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Article 21: That in 
all criminal 
prosecutions every 
man hath a right 
... to a speedy 
trial by an 
impartial jury, 
without whose 
unanimous consent 
he ought not to be 
found guilty. 
Amendment VI: In all 
criminal prosecutions, 
the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the 
State and district 
wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, 
2 
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The Maryland Declaration of Rights predates the Federal Bill of 
Rights by 15 years, 3 and there are obvious differences in the language of 
the various cognate provisions. It is therefore not surprising that the 
Maryland Court of Appeals has repeatedly recognized that the Maryland 
provisions, however intertwined with their federal counterparts, are "in-
dependent and separate" from the federal provisions and are "capable of 
divergent effect."4 The question to be explored in this article is the extent 
to which this theoretical potential has actually been realized when the 
Maryland courts have been called upon to decide constitutional criminal 
matters. 
II. RIGHT TO COUNSEL, PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION, AND DUE PROCESS 
Perhaps the most inviting opportunity ever to come before the court 
of appeals to give independent effect to the Maryland Constitution arose 
in Lodowski v. State. 5 In Lodowski, two men robbed and murdered an 
assistant manager of a convenience store and an off-duty police officer 
who was working at the store as a security guard.6 
Several days after the murders, Lodowski became a suspect and was 
taken into custody by police officers, who questioned him at length. At 
first he professed his innocence, but ultimately, he orally confessed his 
guilt. 7 During this phase of the interrogation, Lodowski's mother was 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, VI; Mo. DECL. RTS. art. 21, 22, 24, 26. This article will 
not discuss the Cruel and Unusual Punishment provisions of the Maryland and 
United States Constitutions. 
3. The basic provisions of the Declaration of Rights appeared in the Maryland Consti-
tution of 1776, while the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution 
were enacted in 1791. See Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 245-46, 513 A.2d 299, 
306 (1986) (Lodowski II); Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310, 319,430 A.2d 49,53 (1981). 
4. Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704-05, 426 A.2d 929, 941 (1981); see 
also Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 245, 513 A.2d at 306; Lawrence v. State, 295 Md. 557, 
561, 457 A.2d 1127, 1129 (1983). . 
5. Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985) (Lodowski I), vacated and 
remanded, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986), rev'd on remand, 307 Md. 233, 513 A.2d 299 
(1986). 
6. /d. at 698, 490 A.2d at 1231. The victims were killed in the course of transporting 
store receipts to a bank, and over $20,000 was taken. /d. 
7. /d. at 712-15, 490 A.2d at 1239-40.-
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present at the police station. She was continually assured by police of-
ficers, including a colonel, that her son was being questioned only as a 
witness and not as a suspect. 8 After the oral confession was obtained, the 
police apparently concluded that the subterfuge was no longer necessary, 
and Lodowski's mother was told that her son was now a suspect.9 
At this point, Lodowski's mother moved quickly to obtain counsel 
for her son. Within an hour after learning that Lodowski was a suspect 
she retained two attorneys; within another hour the attorneys were at the 
police station demanding to see their client. 10 
The police refused to permit the lawyers to see Lodowski, who at 
that point was in the process of reducing his oral statement to writing. 11 
The officers took the position that Lodowski had been informed of and 
had waived his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona. 12 The attor-
neys sought the intercession of the local district public defender and of a 
district court judge, but the police stood firm and refused to permit the 
lawyers to see their client. 13 Lodowski finished writing his highly incrim-
inatory statement and was convicted of a host of offenses including mur-
der and robbery with a deadly weapon, and sentenced to death. 14 
A unanimous court of appeals, in strong language, ruled that the 
trial judge had erred in refusing to suppress the written statement. 15 Ap-
plying the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the court 
reasoned that a suspect's waiver of counsel cannot be knowing and vol-
untary if he is not told that attorneys have been retained on his behalf, 
are physically present, and are available for immediate consultation. 16 In 
essence, the court found that knowledge of an abstract right to counsel is 
much different from being informed of the concrete presence of a specific 
attorney. The court thus held "that a suspect must be fully informed of 
the actual presence and availability of counsel who seeks to confer with 
him, in order that any waiver of a right to counsel, as established by 
Miranda, can be knowing and intelligent." 17 
Shortly after Lodowski I was decided, the Supreme Court reached 
8. Appellant'sBriefat 17,Lodowski/(No.l54,1983Term;No.l,l984Term)(Pre-
trial motion hearings record, val. 5, at 127-28). 
9, Lodowski /, 302 Md. at 714, 490 A.2d at 1239. 
10. /d. 
11. /d. 
12. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
13. Lodowski I, 302 Md. at 714, 490 A.2d 1240. 
14. /d. at 698-700, 490 A.2d 1231-32. 
15. /d. at 720-21, 490 A.2d at 1243. Two justices concurred, but discussed only the 
victim impact statement portion of the opinion. See id. at 752-53, 490 A.2d at 1259 
(Eldridge, J., concurring); id. at 753-86, 490 A.2d at 1259-77 (Cole, J., concurring). 
16. /d. at 719-22, 490 A.2d at 1243-44; accord Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 685-86 
(Del. 1983); People v. Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179, 189, 442 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (1982), cert. 
denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); State v. Jackson, 303 So. 2d 734, 737 (La. 1974); Com-
monwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 716-18, 335 N.E.2d 660, 691-92 (1975), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976). 
1 7. Lodowski I, 302 Md. at 721, 490 A. 2d at 1243. 
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the opposite conclusion in Moran v. Burbine. 18 In Burbine, the defendant 
was interrogated by Rhode Island police officers who suspected him of 
murder. Burbine's sister contacted the public defender's office, and an 
assistant public defender telephoned the police and told them that she 
would be representing Burbine if the officers intended to interrogate 
him. 19 She was told that no interrogation would take place; however, the 
opposite turned out to be true. Burbine waived his Miranda rights, con-
fessed, and was convicted of murder. 20 
The Supreme Court found the conduct of the police "distasteful,"21 
but analyzed the waiver of counsel issue in different terms from the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. Over a strong dissent,22 the Supreme 
Court held that a waiver is valid if the will of the suspect is not over-
borne. 23 The Court focused upon matters that are brought to the defend-
ant's attention, and discounted matters of which he is kept in ignorance. 
Burbine was told that he had a right to a lawyer and he freely declined; 
the fact that his family had already been in contact with an attorney was, 
in the Court's opinion, irrelevant.24 Significantly, however, the Court ex-
pressly permitted the states to reach a different result: "Nothing we say 
today disables the States from adopting different requirements for the 
conduct of its employees and officials as a matter of state law."25 
The State of Maryland appealed the judgment in Lodowski I to the 
Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case to 
18. 475 u.s. 412 (1986). 
19. Id. at 415, 416-17. 
20. Id. at 416-18. 
21. /d. at 424. 
22. Id. at 434 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The dissent cited several 
reasons for concluding that a suspect's waiver of his right to counsel is invalid when 
police refuse to allow the suspect's attorney to communicate with him. First, the 
dissent noted the presumption against the validity of constitutional waivers. /d. at 
450-51 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); see, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 
430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). Second, 
the dissent argued that the inherently coercive nature of police interrogation in-
creased the need for a strict presumption against waivers in the custodial interroga-
tion context. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 451 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., 
dissenting); see, e.g., Taque v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470 (1980) (per curiam); 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455; United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36,46 (1951) (Doug-
las, J., concurring). Finally, the dissent relied upon state court interpretations 
which found that misleading police conduct vitiated constitutional waivers. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. at 454-56; see, e.g., Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 685 (Del. 1983); 
Haliburton v. Florida, 476 So. 2d 192, 193-94 (Fla. 1985), vacated and remanded, 
475 U.S. 1078 (1986), aff'd on remand, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987); People v. 
Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179, 189,422 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 
(1983); Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 296, 450 N.E.2d 566, 571 
(1983); Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528, 529 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); see also infra 
notes 42-65 and accompanying text. But see Blanks v. State, 254 Ga. 420, 423, 330 
S.E.2d 575, 579 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986); State v. Beck, 687 
S.W.2d 155, 159 (Mo. 1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986). 
23. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421-24. 
24. /d. at 422-23. 
25. Id. at 428. 
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the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of Burbine.26 The court 
of appeals, in turn, directed the parties to address themselves to the ad-
missibility of Lodowski's confession under the United States Constitu-
tion, the Maryland Constitution, and the non-constitutional law of 
Maryland. 27 
The federal cmitentions were controlled by Burbine, and no con-
vincing non-constitutional state law arguments could be mustered.28 
There were three considerations, however, which created a reasonable 
hope that the defense could prevail under the state constitution. First, 
the court of appeals was already on record in Lodowski I as finding the 
police conduct in the case improper.29 Second, the Supreme Court, find-
ing such tactics distasteful, had all but invited the states to reach a result 
different from Burbine. 3° Finally and most important, the court of ap-
peals was not at all convinced by Burbine: "[W]e do not find the 
[Burbine] Court's reasoning in arriving at these conclusions to be 
persuasive .... " 31 
Nevertheless, the court unanimously rejected the argument that the 
conduct of the police was improper under article 21 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights as denying the assistance of counsel, under article 
22 as compelled self-incrimination, or under article 24 as denying due 
process of law. 32 The court reasoned that however independent the 
Maryland charter may be from its federal counterpart in theory, in prac-
tice decisions of the Supreme Court are virtually direct authority: 
It is true that similar provisions within the Maryland and 
United States Constitutions are independent and separate from 
each other. Generally, however, comparable provisions of the 
two constitutions are deemed to be in pari materia . . . . Here 
the relevant comparable provisions of the State and Federal 
Constitutions were adopted in times not far removed from each 
other. The first ten amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were all 
proposed by Congress on 25 September, 1789, and declared rat-
ified on 15 December 1791. Provisions comparable to the Fifth 
Amendment clauses concerning self-incrimination and due pro-
cess of law and the Sixth Amendment clause concerning assist-
ance of counsel appeared in the Declaration of Rights, 
Constitution of Maryland (1776) and in each Constitution 
thereafter. Thus, the concern with self-incrimination, assist-
ance of counsel and due process of law was shared by those 
26. Maryland v. Lodowski, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986). 
27. Order of the Maryland Court of Appeals, April4, 1986, Lodowski II (No. 154, 1983 
Term; No. 1, 1984 Term). 
28. See Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 241-44, 513 A.2d 299, 304-05 (1986). 
29. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
30. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 428; see also supra text accompanying note 25. 
31. Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 242, 513 A.2d at 304. 
32. /d. at 246-49, 513 A.2d 306-08. 
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who framed the Federal Constitution and those who framed the 
Maryland constitution. This concern on the part of the drafters 
of each constitution was implanted in the same climate and 
nurtured by the same hopes and fears. The provisions, so alike 
in aim and content, were proposed and accepted by those anx-
ious to preserve the freedom and rights they had so arduously 
won. As stated in the preamble to the Declaration of Rights, 
the provisions were prompted by the People 'grateful to Al-
mighty God for [their] civil and religious liberty, and taking 
into [their] serious consideration the best means of establishing 
a good Constitution in this State for the sure foundation and 
more permanent security thereof .... ' We cannot say, in the 
frame of reference here, that the Federal provisions and the 
State provisions are to be construed and applied differently. 
This view is amply supported by what we have said in the 
past. 33 · 
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The court then proceeded to reject each of Lodowski's state consti-
tutional theories on the basis of similar reasoning. With respect to com-
pelled self-incrimination, the court concluded that under its previous 
holdings the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights will be construed to 
confer equivalent rights. 34 The court acknowledged that it had previ-
ously found article 22 to be "an inhibition upon the government of the 
State of Maryland,"35 but found no reason to conclude that its protec-
tions of the accused "were any greater or different than the rights guar-
anteed by the Fifth Amendment."36 
The court next considered Lodowski's right to counsel under article 
21, and dismissed the matter in a single. paragraph: 
Article 21 of the Maryland· Declaration of Rights declares 
'[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... 
to be allowed counsel. ... ' We stated flatly in State v. Tichnel/: 
33. Id. at 245-46, 513 A.2d at 306 (citations and footnote omitted). In support of the 
proposition that comparable provisions of the two constitutions are deemed to be in 
pari materia, the court cited the following cases: Crawford v. State, 285 Md. 431, 
404 A.2d 244 (1979); Richardson v. State, 285 Md. 261, 401 A.2d 1021 (1979); State 
v. Panagoulis, 253 Md. 699, 253 A.2d 877 (1969); Brown v. State, 233 Md. 288, 196 
A.2d 614 (1964); Bass v. State, 182 Md. 496, 35 A.2d 155 (1943); Blum v. State, 94 
Md. 375, 51 A. 26 (1902). See also Northampton Corp. v. Washington Suburban 
Sanitary Comm'n, 278 Md. 677, 686, 366 A.2d 377, 382 (1976) (article 23 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights and the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution have the same effect with regard to 
the exaction of property); Rafferty v. Comptroller, 228 Md. 153, 161, 178 A.2d 896, 
900 (1962) (article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution have the 
same effect with regard to State income tax). 
34. Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 246-47, 513 A.2d at 306-07. 
35. Id. at 247, 513- A.2d at 307 (quoting Marshall v. State, 182 Md. 370, 383, 35 A.2d 
115, 117 (1943)). 
36. Id. 
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'There is no distinction between the right to counsel guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights ... .' We again set out this view in Clark v. 
State .... Accordingly, with regard to the allowance of coun-
sel provision of Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights, we ad-
here to the construction the Supreme Court has placed on the 
like provision of the Sixth Amendment. 37 
Finally, the court rejected Lodowski's due process contention under 
article 24. While recognizing that due process may provide a source for 
an entitlement to counsel that would not otherwise exist, the court never-
theless found that under Burbine, any right that existed had been 
waived. 38 The court reasoned that: 
Under Burbine the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not operate to vitiate Burbine's waiver, and we 
see nothing in Sites 39 or Rutherford 40 to compel a broader con-
struction of the Law of the land clauses of Maryland's Declara-
tion of Rights so as to vitiate a waiver otherwise proper.41 
In sum, the court concluded that the Maryland Constitution af-
forded no relief to Lowodski because the Supreme Court had found that 
the cognate provisions of the United States Constitution afforded the de-
fendant no relief. 
Appellate courts in other states have viewed the matter differently. 
Even before Burbine was decided, a number of state courts found that 
actions by the police which prevented attorneys from consulting with 
suspects in custody were repugnant to state constitutions as well as to the 
federal charter. For example, in Lewis v. State,42 the Oklahoma court 
found that where a defendant was not told that his attorney had arrived 
at the police station, the admission of his confession violated his right to 
37. /d. (citations omitted). 
38. /d. at 248-49, 513 A.2d at 307-08. The court recognized that both article 24 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provide a right to counsel independent of the right provided 
under the Sixth Amendment. /d. at 248, 513 A.2d at 307. The court also expressly 
stated that "Lodowski was entitled to counsel during his custodial interrogation 
resulting in his third statement." /d. at 249, 513 A.2d at 308; see also text accompa-
nying notes 11-14. The court, however, concluded that the relevant issue was not 
whether Lodowski was entitled to counsel, but rather, whether his right had been 
effectively waived. Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 249, 513 A.2d at 308. 
39. In Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702,481 A.2d 192 (1984), the court found that as a matter 
of due process an individual arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated is 
entitled to counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to a breathalyzer test. [foot-
note by Author-Ed.] 
40. In Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 464 A.2d 228 (1983), the court con-
cluded that due process required a right to counsel before a defendant in a civil 
contempt proceeding could be sentenced to actual incarceration. [footnote by Au-
thor-Ed.] 
41. Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 249, 513 A.2d at 308. 
42. 695 P.2d 528 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984). 
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counsel and privilege against self-incrimination under the Oklahoma 
Constitution.43 Similarly, in State v. Haynes,44 the Supreme Court of Or-
egon ruled that where a suspect was removed from jail to prevent contact 
with his soon-to-arrive attorney, the admission of his statement violated, 
inter alia, the provisions of the Oregon Constitution condemning invol-
untarily-obtained statements.45 Finally, in State v. Matthews,46 it was 
held that the Louisiana Constitution was violated where the police ig-
nored a telephone request from an attorney to cease interviewing her cli-
ent until she could confer with him.47 
While Burbine was pending before the Supreme Court, an interest-
ing instance of "anticipatory federalism" confronted the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals of Texas. In Dunn v. State,48 the court was faced with an 
issue identical to the issue in Burbine - whether a suspect in custody can 
knowingly waive the right to counsel when, unknown to him, his wife 
has arranged for an attorney to represent him but the police refuse to 
permit consultation.49 The court anticipated the possibility that it would 
be called upon to "depart from the path laid down by the Supreme 
Court,"50 yet it proceeded to find that under the facts there could be no 
knowing and intelligent waiver. 51 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
expressly relied upon both the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution. 52 
After Burbine was decided, the departure anticipated by the Dunn 
court was made by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Hous-
ton.53 In Houston, the suspect was taken into custody and questioned 
about certain narcotics offenses. During the interrogation, friends of the 
suspect retained an attorney. The lawyer telephoned the police station 
and subsequently arrived there in an effort to consult with the suspect 
before his client confessed, but was rebuffed by the officers. The suspect 
confessed and was convicted. 54 
Relying upon Justice Stevens' "searing and scholarly dissent" in 
Burbine 55 as well as a number of state court cases56 (ironically, including 
43. /d. at 529-31 (citing with approval State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 59,602 P.2d 272 (1979), 
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980)); see also OKLA. CONST. art. II §§ 7, 20, 21. 
44. 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980). 
45. /d. at 71-75, 602 P.2d 278-80; see also OR. CONST. art. I, § 12. The court also found 
that the police conduct violated the defendant's federal Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. /d. at 74, 602 P.2d at 279. 
46. 408 So. 2d 1274 (La. 1982). 
47. /d. at 1276-78; see also LA. CoNST. art. I,§ 13; LA. C. CR. P. art. 230, 511. 
48. 696 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1089 (1986). 
49. /d. at 567; see also supra text accompanying notes 18-20. 
50. Dunn, 696 S.W.2d at 567; see also id. at 568 n.2. 
51. /d. at 569-70. 
52. /d. at 570; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
53. 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986). 
54. /d. at 599-600, 724 P.2d at 1167-68, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 142-43. 
55. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 434-68 (1986) (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, 
JJ., dissenting). 
56. See, e.g., Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 685-87 (Del. 1983); Haliburton v. State, 476 
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Lodowski I), the court found the conduct of the officers indefensible. 57 
Like the court of appeals in Lodowski II, the California court noted that 
the Supreme Court had expressly permitted the states to decide the mat-
ter for themselves, and found the reasoning of Burbine unpersuasive. 58 
Where the Houston court differed from the Maryland Court of Appeals 
was in its approach to federalism and to the persuasiveness of Supreme 
Court holdings: 
By its terms, Burbine leaves the states .free to '[adopt] dif-
ferent requirements for the conduct of [their] employees and 
officials as a matter of state law ... .' It is settled beyond de-
bate, of course, that our state Constitution is 'a document of 
independent force' ... ; unless a contrary intent is apparent, its 
guarantees 'are not dependent on those [provided] by the 
United States Constitution.' ... 
We sit as a court of last resort on the meaning of Califor-
nia's Declaration of Rights. Our decisions cannot limit federal 
guarantees, but restrictive federal interpretations of the United 
States Constitution do not preclude a finding that the Constitu-
tion of our state accords its citizens greater individual rights 
. . . . Indeed, in the federal system, state charters offer impor-
tant local protection against the ebbs and flows of federal con-
stitutional interpretation .... 
We do not depart lightly from clear United States Supreme 
Court rulings. The high court's decisions defining fundamental 
rights and liberties are entitled to 'respectful consideration.' 
But they are to be followed in California 'only where they pro-
vide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by Califor-
nia law.' . . . In appropriate cases, we have forthrightly 
rejected adherence to United States Supreme Court precedent 
... even where it was necessary to overrule our own prior deci-
sion adopti~g the federal rule. 59 
The court accordingly held that the conduct of the police violated 
article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, providing that 
"[p]ersons may not ... be compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness 
against themselves ... ,"and the separate guarantee of the same provision 
So. 2d 192, 193-94 (Fla. 1985), vacated and remanded, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986), aff'd 
on remand, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987); Davis v. State, 287 So. 2d 399, 400 (Fla. 
App. 1973); People v. Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179, 189,442 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (1982), cert. 
denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274, 1278 (La. 1982); 
Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 324, 244 N.E.2d 560, 566 (1969); 
Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528, 530 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 
59, 71-72, 602 P.2d 272, 278 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980); State v. 
Jones, 578 P.2d 71, 73 (Wash. App. 1978). 
57. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d at 604-05, 607-10, 724 P.2d at 1170-71, 1173-74, 230 Cal. Rptr. 
at 145, 147-49. 
58. /d. at 609-10, 724 P.2d at 1174, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49. 
59. /d. (footnotes and citations omitted): 
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that "[t]he defendant in a criminal cause has the right . to have the 
assistance of counsel for the defendant's defense ~ .. ·."60 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut also rejected Burbine in State v. 
Stoddard. 61 There, an attorney's telephone request to speak to a suspect 
in custody was met with the false response that the suspect in fact was 
not being held. Unaware that such efforts were being made on his behalf, 
the defendant waived his Miranda rights and made an inculpatory 
statement. 62 
The appellate court began its analysis by noting that Burbine per-
mitted the states to reach their own conclusions, and observed that 
"[t]his· recognition, no doubt mandated in part by well known principles 
of federalism; Michigan v. Long was also prompted by a reluctance to 
intrude into the administration of state criminal processes."63 
Turning to its own constitution, the Stoddard court traced the his-
tory of the development of the right to counsel in Connecticut. Finding 
that the Connecticut courts have long taken great care to assure the rep-
resentation of the criminally accused, the court held that the police are 
obligated to apprise a suspect promptly of efforts made by an attorney to 
render assistance.64 It predicated that conclusion upon the due process 
clause of article 1, section 8 of the Connecticut Constitution.65 
In summary, the question of whether to follow the Supreme Court's 
holding in Burbine has confronted the appellate courts of a number of 
states. The divergent results in these cases cannot be traced to the lan-
guage of the particular state constitutional provisions at issue, as each 
60. /d. at 600 n.2, 724 P.2d at 1167 n.2, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 142 n.2; see also CAL CONST. 
art. I, § 15. 
61. 206 Conn. 157, 537 A.2d 446 (1988). 
62. /d. at 160-62, 537 A.2d at 449-50. 
63. /d. at 164, 537 A.2d at 451 (citation omitted). In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 
(1983), the Supreme Court discussed at length its own lack of jurisdiction where the 
ruling of the state court below is predicated upon an adequate and independent 
ground of state law. /d. at 1037-44. The Court held that it is empowered to hear a 
case where the lower court clearly relied upon federal principles, or where the state 
court's analysis could reasonably be construed as relying upon federal principles. 
/d. at 1040-42. Conversely, where the lower court plainly relied upon rules of state 
law, its holding is not subject to Supreme Court review unless the state law contra-
venes the United States Constitution. /d. Michigan v. Long is relevant to the sub-
ject of this article because it implies that a holding predicated upon a state 
constitutional theory which confers greater protection upon a criminal defendant 
than does the cognate provision of the United States Constitution is not subject to 
review by the Supreme Court. 
64. Stoddard, 206 Conn. at 166-67, 537 A.2d at 452. 
65. Article 1, section 8 of the Connecticut Constitution provides: "No person shall be 
compelled to give evidence against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law, nor shall excessive bail be required nor excessive 
fines imposed." CONN. CONST., art. I, § 8. 
Although Stoddard and Houston both rejected the rationale of Burbine, other 
courts, over forceful dissents, have followed Burbine. See People v. Holland, 121 Ill. 
2d 136, 520 N.E.2d 270 (1987); State v. Drayton, 293 S.C. 417, 361 S.E.2d 329 
(1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1060 (1988). 
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involved charter mandates in general terms that a defendant in a criminal 
case shall have a right to counsel and a privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. Instead, the divergence must be traced to a difference in 
philosophy concerning the proper deference owed to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
III. USE OF PROSECUTOR'S PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
TO STRIKE BLACK PROSPECTIVE JURORS 
An important issue in federalism was created when the Supreme 
Court responded to the tactic employed by some prosecutors of using 
peremptory challenges to remove black prospective jurors, particularly in 
cases involving a black defendant and a white victim, by initially refusing 
to condemn that practice in any significant way. While some state 
courts, including the Court of Appeals of Maryland, followed the lead of 
the Supreme Court, others did not. The difference in approach is 
instructive. 
At the height of a very active period in the history of the American 
civil rights movement, the Supreme Court decided Swain v. Alabama.66 
In Swain, the prosecutor removed all six black potential jurors through a 
procedure equivalent to the peremptory challenge. 67 The defendant chal-
lenged this practice as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court, 
however, rejected the challenge, reasoning that, historically, peremptory 
challenges had provided trial counsel with an unfettered right to remove 
prospective jurors without accounting for the motivations behind the re-
movals. 68 The Court went on to note that counsel may properly use a 
juror's group affiliation as a kind of shorthand for dividing the individual 
characteristics of persons who under ordinary circumstances must be to-
tal strangers to the attorneys. 69 On the basis of this reasoning, the Swain 
Court concluded that a defendant cannot establish unconstitutional ra-
cial discrimination on the basis of a single case. 70 Only when the prose-
cutor's office operated in a discriminatory manner in a series of cases 
could a cognizable claim be established.71 
Subsequent to the Swain decision, developments under a different 
constitutional theory began to cast doubt upon the continuing viability of 
its holding. Under these decisions, the principle was established that the 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury included a right to 
66. 380 u.s. 202 (1965). 
67. See id. at 210. At the time of this case, Alabama employed a "struck-jury system" 
to impanel a petit jury. Under this system, the defense would strike two potential 
jurors and the prosecution one, in alternating turns, until a large venire was reduced 
to only twelve members. /d. 
68. /d. at 212-22. 
69. /d. at 220-21. 
70. /d. at 222-28. 
71. /d. at 227. 
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trial by a jury drawn from a "fair cross-section" of the community.72 
The cases held that under the fair cross-section requirement, the states 
were prohibited from systematically excluding any "cognizable group" 
from jury service. 73 Therefore, if a state's system of drawing individuals 
from the community for jury service had the effect of disproportionately 
excluding groups such as blacks and women from the process, it contra-
vened the Sixth Amendment. ·' 
When the Supreme Court revisited the subject of racially discrimi-
natory peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky,14 it was natural to 
expect that it would reconsider Swain and possibly overrule it on fair 
cross-section grounds. Instead, .the Court departed from the fair cross-
section grounds upon which it had granted certiorari and held in favor of 
the defendant on an equal protection theory. 75 The Court ruled that 
henceforth a defendant could establish an equal protection violation on 
· the basis of a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in a single case. 76 
The question of federalism arose during the interim period between 
Swain and Batson, when some state courts were called upon to decide 
whether to afford greater protection to defendants than was provided by 
Swain. People v. Wheeler, 77 is a particularly notable example of a state 
court's reliance on a state constitution to resolve this issue. In Wheeler, 
two black men were on trial for the murder of a white grocery store 
owner. During the voir dire process, the prosecutor used his peremptory 
challenges to remove all of the black prospective jurors. An all-white 
jury convicted both defendants. 78 
The defendants on appeal relied upon the right to an impartial jury 
secured by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. 79 The 
court, in a well considered opinion, found error largely on the basis of 
fair cross-section cases, fashioned a remedy, and only then mentioned the 
72. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 
(1975). 
73. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 363-67; Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538. 
74. 476 u.s. 79 (1986). 
75. The Court explained its decision by stating "that resolution of petitioner's claim 
properly turns on application of equal protection principles .... " /d. at 84 n.4. This 
decision is particularly suprising in light of the fact that the petitioner neither raised 
nor briefed an equal protection argument. See id. at 111-18 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
76. /d. at 93-100. To implement its holding, the Court placed the initial burden upon 
the defense to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination through an exami-
nation of, inter alia, the pattern of strikes exercised by the prosecutor and the re-
spective races of the major trial participants. Id. at 96-98. In the event that a prima 
facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to provide a spe-
cific, racially neutral explanation for his challenges. /d. at 97. It is then the respon-
sibility of the trial judge to determine where the truth lies, and if necessary to 
fashion an appropriate remedy. /d. at 98 & n.21. 
77. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). 
78. Id. at 262-63, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893. 
79. Id. at 265-66, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895-96. Article I, section 16 of the 
California Constitution provides in relevant part: "Trial by jury is an inviolate right 
and shall be secured to all .... " CAL CONST. art. I, § 16. 
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Supreme Court case directly on point, Swain. Its attitude toward Swain 
was revealed in the first sentence of its discussion . of that precedent: 
"The People nevertheless contend that we are compelled to allow this 
pernicious practice to continue in our courts by the case of Swain v. Ala-
bama .... " 80 Rejecting that premise, the court went on to make clear 
that it would never be "compelled" to follow any Supreme Court prece-
dent that provided less protection for state citizens than did California 
law: 
Because a fundamental safeguard of the California Declaration 
of Rights is at issue, however, 'our first referent is California 
Law' and divergent decisions of the United State Supreme 
Court 'are to be followed by California courts only when they 
provide no less protection than is guaranteed by California 
law.' ... It is apparent that Swain provides less protection to 
California residents than the rule we now adopt. Under Swain 
a defendant is barred from vindicating his right to an impartial 
jury unless he can provide that over a long period of time the 
same prosecutor has struck every black from every petit jury 
'whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever 
the defendant or the victim may be.'81 
The Wheeler court expressly recognized that another path was open 
to it-to distinguish Swain as an equal protection case while granting 
relief on fair cross-section grounds, and thereby avoid a direct clash with 
Supreme Court precedent. The court, however, rejected this course in 
light of its belief that the contemporary Supreme Court would adhere to 
Swain even in the face of a challenge based upon the Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury.82 Instead, it decided the case under its own 
constitution. 83 
A few months later, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
reached the same result in Commonwealth v. Soares. 84 The court relied 
upon substantial scholarly commentary in noting that "[s]ince its release 
in 1965, Swain has been the subject of extensive and biting criticism."85 
Finding Swain's burden of proof requirement to be unrealistic and unfair, 
the court granted relief under article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights. In language quite similar· to article 24 of the Maryland Decla-
ration of Rights, the Massachusetts article provides: 
And no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or de-
prived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the 
protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or 
80. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 283, 583 P.2d at 766, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907 (citation omitted). 
81. /d. at 285, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908 (citations omitted). 
82. /d. at 284-85, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908. 
83. /d. at 285-87, 583 P.2d at 767-68, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908-10. 
84. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). 
85. /d. at 476-77 n.11, 387 N.E.2d 510 n.11. 
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estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the 
land.86 
69 
The Soares court showed greater deference to the Supreme Court 
than its California counterpart in Wheeler, and its language was more 
temperate. 87 The result, however, was the same- a state court refused 
to follow Swain in interpreting its own constitution. 
Wheeler and Soares had already been decided when the issue of ra-
cial discrimination in peremptory challenges first came before the Mary-
land Court of Appeals. In Lawrence v. State,88 all three black 
prospective jurors were peremptorily stricken by the prosecutor. Defense 
counsel objected, the trial court overruled the objection, and Lawrence 
was convicted of first-degree murder. 89 In the court of appeals, the de-
fense relied upon articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights, cited Wheeler and Soares, and asked that the court decline to 
follow Swain. The court, however, rejected this position by reasoning 
that fair cross-section analysis antedated Swain by twenty years, and that 
nothing in the cases requiring a representative jury involved the use of 
peremptory challenges or in any way repudiated that decision.90 
In support of its conclusion that Swain remained the controlling 
precedent, the court of appeals proceeded to quote at length from its 
holding in Attorney General v. Waldron 91 concerning the relationship be-
tween the equal protection guarantees of the state and federal charters: 
It is the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion which is here involved, where it provides in pertinent part: 
'No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the law.' ... Although the Maryland Con-
stitution contains no express equal protection clause, we deem 
it settled that this concept of equal treatment is embodied in the 
due process requirement of Article 24 of the Declaration of 
Rights . . . . It is, perhaps, because this State has no express 
equal protection clause that Article 24 has been interpreted to 
apply 'in like manner and to the same extent as the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution,' ... so that 'decisions 
of the Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are prac-
tically direct authorities.' . . . While it is true, as our later dis-
cussion will show, that the equal protection guaranties of 
Article 24 and the fourteenth amendment are independent, ca-
pable of divergent effect, it is apparent that the two are so inter-
twined that they, in essence, form a double helix, each 
86 .. MASS. DECL. RTS., art. 12. 
87. Compare Soares, 377 Mass. at 477 n.12, 387 N.E.2d at 510 & n.12 with Wheeler, 22 
Cal. 3d at 283, 583 P.2d at 767, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 908. 
88. 295 Md. 557, 457 A.2d 1127 (1983). 
89. /d. at 558-59, 457 A.2d at 1128. 
90. /d. at 566, 457 A.2d at 1131. 
91. 289 Md. 683, 426 A.2d 929 (1981). 
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complementing the other. Because the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court are not only controlling as to our inter-
pretation and application of the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment but also persuasive as we undertake to 
interpret Article 24, we first examine the currents of the federal 
analysis prior to determining the impact of these Constitutional 
guaranties in this case. 
* * * 
When evaluating an equal protection claim grounded on Arti-
cle 24, we utilize in large measure the basic analysis provided 
by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the like 
provision contained in the fourteenth amendment. Conse-
quently, when under the auspices of federal equal protection, 
certain important private interests are vindicated by the High 
Court through an active scrutiny of legislative classifications, it 
is not surprising that most of the decisions of this Court reflect 
the same trend. Although the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment and the equal protection principle em-
bodied in Article 24 are 'in pari materia,' and decisions apply-
ing one provision are persuasive authority in cases involving the 
other, we reiterate that each provision is independent, and a 
violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other.92 
The court went on to dispose of the article 21 right to jury trial 
contention in a similar fashion. Quoting from its decision in Stewart v. 
State,93 the court continued: 
In Harris . .. we declared the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights 
of the Maryland Constitution to be self-executing. . . . In Smith 
v. State we discussed the interplay between the two constitu-
tional provisions. We concluded 'that the opinions of the 
Supreme Court interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy trial are "very persuasive, although not necessarily con-
trolling,'' as to the proper construction of Maryland's parallel 
Article 21 right.' ... In Erbe ... however, we pointed out that 
'[t]he language used in Art. 21 of our Declaration of Rights 
relative to speedy trial is virtually identical with that in the 
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.'94 
92. Lawrence, 295 Md. at 560-61, 457 A.2d at 1128-29 (citations omitted) (quoting 
Waldron, 289 Md. at 714, 426 A.2d at 946). With respect to the similarity in inter-
pretation between the Fourteenth Amendment and article 24 of the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights, the court relied upon the following cases: United States 
Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 167 Md. 383, 395, 177 A.2d 903, 909 (1934), rev'd on 
other grounds, 293 U.S. 232 (1937); Detroit Automotive Purchasing Services v. Lee, 
463 F. Supp. 957, 970 (D. Md. 1978); Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & 
Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 156, 321 A.2d 748, 755 (1974). 
93. 282 Md. 557, 386 A.2d 1206 (1978). 
94. Lawrence, 295 Md. at 562, 457 A.2d at 1129 (quoting Stewart, 282 Md. at 570, 386 
A.2d at 1206). 
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The court proceeded to find that prosecutors are presumed to exer-
cise peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner, and that the use 
of strikes to remove all three black prospective jurors from the panel was 
insufficient to rebut the presumption. Lawrence's conviction was there-
fore affirmed. 95 
Two years later in Evans v. State,96 the defense contention received a 
more receptive hearing, but once again met with a negative result. In 
Evans, the state utilized most of its ten challenges to remove black jurors. 
The prosecutor, in response to defense counsel's objection, stated that 
"[w]e struck on background, age, occupation, what we learned during 
the voir dire at the bench and in open court. We did not strike on racial 
grounds. " 97 
The court on this occasion saw "considerable force" in Evans' argu-
ment that Swain was no longer controlling, but declined to decide the 
question because it found the uncontroverted explanation by the prosecu-
tor sufficient to rebut the defense contention.98 The court also gave full 
consideration to the Wheeler I Soares line of reasoning, and did so without 
apparent disapproval and without lengthy quotation from in pari materia 
cases. 99 It is therefore possible to discern some evolution in the court's 
thinking, and to speculate that had Batson not come along the court 
might eventually have distinguished Swain on fair cross-section grounds 
or departed from it under the Maryland Constitution. The end result, 
however, is that while some state courts were employing their own con-
stitutions to reject a heavily-criticized federal precedent, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals declined to do so. 
IV. THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
The law of search and seizure has proved in recent years to be a 
continuing source of friction between the state and federal courts. As 
Warren Court precedents have given way in many cases to more prosecu-
tion-oriented decisions under Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist, state 
95. /d. at 567-72, 457 A.2d at 1132-34. After Batson was decided, the court of appeals 
viewed the matter much differently. For example, in Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 
542 A.2d 1267 (1988), the court found that the appellant had demonstrated a prima 
facie case of discrimination where the prosecutor had used one peremptory chal-
lenge to strike a black juror and bring about an all-white jury. 
96. 304 Md. 487, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985). 
97. /d. at 524, 499 A.2d at 1280. In Stanley, the court of appeals made clear that after 
Batson such an explanation would be insufficient, as the prosecutor is required to 
provide a specific explanation for each challenge. Stanley, 313 Md. at 80, 88, 542 
A.2d at 1271, 1281. 
98. Evans, 304 Md. at 525-26, 499 A.2d at 1282. 
99. /d. at 526-28, 499 A.2d at 1281-82. As noted by the court, other authorities have 
also analyzed the issue in a manner inconsistent with Swain. See McCray v. 
Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1131 (2d Cir. 1984) (Sixth Amendment forbids the prose-
cution from using peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely on the basis of 
race); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984) (rejecting Swain under the Florida 
Constitution); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M. App. 1980). 
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courts have adhered to prior law through application of their own stat-
utes, court rules, and constitutions. 100 
Among the most important issues in this area is the definition of 
"probable cause" - that is, when do police possess sufficient information 
to justify the intrusion of an arrest or a search and seizure? Prior to 
1983, the sufficiency of probable cause to obtain a warrant was judged by 
the rules of Aguilar v. Texas 101 and Spinelli v. United States 102 ("Aguilar-
Spinelli"). Under these cases, issuance of a warrant was justified only if 
the issuing magistrate was satisfied of both the veracity of the informant 
who provided the information to the police and the informant's basis of 
knowledge of the reported information. 103 If either "prong" of this test 
was unsatisfied, the warrant application failed to demonstrate sufficient 
probable cause. 
In Illinois v. Gates, 104 the Supreme Court rejected the Aguilar-
Spinelli test, finding it insufficiently flexible. The Court substituted a "to-
tality of the circumstances" approach, under which an informant's verac-
ity and basis of knowledge remained relevant criteria but were no longer 
essential to a finding of probable cause. 105 
As the Aguilar-Spinel/i approach is more restrictive than that of 
Gates, the states are free under their own laws to retain the older analy-
sis.106 As with the aftermath of Burbine and Swain, state courts have 
divided concerning their adherence to the federal precedent embodied in 
Gates when interpreting their own constitutions. 
The issue came before the Maryland Court of Appeals in Potts v. 
State. 107 In Potts, a search of the defendant's residence was conducted 
pursuant to a warrant issued prior to the Gates decision, but the matter 
was not litigated until after the issuance of the opinion. Among the is-
sues to be decided was whether the Maryland courts should reject Gates 
altogether and apply a stricter test of probable cause under article 26 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 108 The court of appeals disposed of 
that argument in familiar terms: 
Article 26 and the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion developed from the same historical background. . . . Ac-
cordingly, we have said on numerous occasions that Article 26 
is in pari materia with its federal counterpart and decisions of 
the Supreme Court interpreting the Fourth Amendment are en-
titled to great respect. Giving due regard to the reasoning in 
100. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ l.3 (2d Ed. 1987); Wilkes, More on the 
New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 873 (1975). 
101. 378 u.s. 108 (1964). 
102. 393 u.s. 410 (1969). 
103. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415-16; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110-15. 
104. 462 u.s. 213 (1983). 
105. /d. at 230-39. 
106. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983); see also supra note 63. 
107. 300 Md. 567, 479 A.2d 1335 (1984). 
108. /d. at 576, 479 A.2d at 1340. 
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Gates and Upton, we decline to adopt a probable cause standard 
under Art. 26 which is different than that applied under the 
Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the appropriate standard 
for reviewing a magistrate's probable cause determination 
under Art. 26 is the totality of the circumstances analysis as set 
forth in Gates and Upton . ... 1o9 
73 
A completely different approach from that of the Maryland Court of 
Appeals in Potts was taken by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts in Commonwealth v. Upton. 110 When Upton's case first reached 
109. /d. (citations omitted). Unlike the unanimous decisions in the overwhelming major-
ity of in pari materia cases, Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310,430 A.2d 49 (1981), upon 
which the court relied, is interesting because it contained a dissent. In United States 
v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), the Supreme Court had recently overruled Jones v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), and abrogated the rule that an individual 
charged with possession of an illegal substance has "automatic standing" to chal-
lenge the seizure of the contraband. In Gahan, the court of appeals was urged to 
retain the automatic standing concept under article 26 of the Declaration of Rights. 
Discussing the in pari materia precedents at length, the court rejected this position. 
Gahan, 290 Md. at 319-22, 430 A.2d at 53-55. 
Judge Davidson dissented. On the merits, she concluded that automatic stand-
ing was a sound rule that should be retained. The dissent's proposed solution was to 
so hold under article 26: 
I agree with the majority that 'Art. 26 is in pari materia with the 
Fourth· Amendment' and that in considering Art. 26, 'decisions of the 
Supreme Court on the kindred Fourth Amendment are entitled to great 
respect.' . . . Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment and Art. 26 are in-
dependent and capable of divergent effect. Although decisions of the 
Supreme Court are controlling when we interpret the Federal Constitu-
tion, they are only persuasive when we interpret the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights .... 
Under the circumstances here, I would adhere to this Court's ration-
ale in [Duncan v. State, 276 Md. 715, 351 A.2d 144 (1976)] and I would 
hold that under Art. 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights in cases 
involving possessory offenses, an accused has 'automatic standing' and is 
not required to establish affirmatively either a possessory interest in the 
property seized or a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises 
searched in order to have standing to challenge a search and seizure. 
Gahan, 290 Md. at 331, 430 A.2d at 60 (Davidson, J., dissenting) (citations omit-
ted). 
The Gates decision involved a search pursuant to a warrant. A related question 
is whether the "totality of the circumstances" approach should also replace the 
Aguilar-Spine IIi analysis in the context of a warrantless search and seizure. In Mal-
colm v. State, 314 Md. 221, 550 A.2d 670 (1988), the court of appeals was urged to 
reject the totality approach under both the federal and state constitutions in the 
warrantless search and seizure context. The court held that Gates applies to war-
rantless searches as a matter of Fourth Amendment law, and brushed aside the state 
constitutional argument in a footnote: "Article 26 is in pari materia with the fourth 
amendment .... [citing Potts and Gahan]" Id. at 227 n.8, 550 A.2d at 673 n.8. The 
court, however, did acknowledge that other state courts had rejected the Gates ap-
proach in the warrantless search and seizure context under their own constitutions. 
Id. at 230-31 n.ll, 550 A.2d at 674-75 n.ll; see, e.g., State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 
219, 496 A.2d 498 (1985); People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 
N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985). 
110. 390 Mass. 562, 458 N.E.2d 717 (1983), rev'd, 466 U.S. 727 (1984). 
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Massachusetts' highest court, the tribunal found error in the denial of a 
motion to suppress certain evidence for lack of probable cause to search 
the mobile home where Upton had lived. The court reasoned that Gates 
had worked a relatively minor modification of the Aguilar-Spinel/i analy-
sis and had left it largely intact. 111 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed.112 The Court chastised the Massachusetts court for misunder-
standing its opinion in Gates, which it characterized as having 
completely abolished the unrealistic and hypertechnical doctrine of Agui-
lar-Spinel/i.113 
The Massachusetts court struck back. 114 Relying upon article 14 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 115 the court concluded that the 
Gates standard was too imprecise and too permissive, and that it pro-
vided insufficient guidance to serve as a proper definition of probable 
cause. 116 Accordingly, the Aguilar-Spinel/i analysis was reinstated. 117 
In reaching this conclusion, the court described the relationship be-
tween the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts charter in 
the following terms: 
The Constitution of the Commonwealth preceded and is in-
dependent of the Constitution of the United States. In fact, 
portions of the Constitution of the United States are based on 
provisions in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and this 
has been thought to be particularly true of the relationship be-
tween the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 .... In particular 
situations, on similar facts, we have reached different results 
under the State Constitution from those that were reached by 
the Supreme Court of the United States under the Federal Con-
stitution. On occasion, the differences can be explained because 
of different language in the two Constitutions. . . . On the other 
hand, in deciding similar constitutional questions, the two 
courts have reached contrary results based on differences of 
opinion concerning the application of similar constitutional 
111. /d. at 568, 458 N.E.2d at 720-21. 
112. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984). 
113. /d. at 732-33. 
114. Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985). 
115. Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides: 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and 
seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All 
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of 
them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order 
in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to 
arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their. property, be not 
accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, 
arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with 
the formalities prescribed by the laws. 
MASS. DECL. RTs. art. XIV. 
116. Upton, 394 Mass. at 370-74, 476 N.E.2d at 554-56. 
117. Jd. at 374-77, 476 N.E.2d at 556-58. 
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principles. . 118 
In other contexts as well, Supreme Court decisions in the search and 
seizure area have been modified or rejected by jurisdictions other than 
Maryland in the interest of insulating older principles from the Supreme 
Court's conservatism. 119 Moreover, those courts taking a more in-
dependent stance have at times done so notwithstanding the nearly iden-
tical language of the Fourth Amendment and the cognate state 
provision. 120 
V. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The most recent instance in which the Maryland Court of Appeals 
has been urged to deviate from Supreme Court precedent in construing 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights involved the proper standard for 
assessing the effective assistance of counsel in criminal cases. State v. 
Colvin 121 arose out of a defendant's collateral attack upon his conviction 
and sentence of death in post-conviction proceedings. Among the issues 
presented was whether Colvin had been denied the effective assistance of 
counsel secured by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
118. /d. at 372,476 N.E.2d at 555 (citations omitted). The court cited several Massachu-
setts cases that have reached results at odds with the Supreme Court. Compare Moe 
v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981) with Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (funding of medically necessary abortions); District 
Attorney v. Watson, 381 Mass. 648, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (1980) with Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (constitutionality of the death penalty); Commonwealth v. 
Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) with Swain 
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospec-
tive jurors on the basis of race). The court also noted other cases that could be 
distinguished on the basis of differing language in the respective constitutions. Com-
pare Commonwealth v. Sees, 374 Mass. 532, 373 N.E.2d 1151 (1978) with Doran v. 
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (right to restrict free speech in places dispens-
ing alcoholic beverages) and Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 
445 N.E.2d 590 (1983) (right under article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights to seek signatures on private property in connection with ballot access) with 
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (no first amendment right to picket in a 
privately owned shopping center). 
119. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982) (right of privacy in records 
of long-distance telephone calls recognized under New Jersey Constitution despite 
lack of such right under Fourth Amendment); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 
(S.D. 1976) (inventory search found unreasonable under the South Dakota Consti-
tution despite federal Supreme Court's ruling in the same case that search was 
proper); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (consent to a search 
found invalid under New Jersey Constitution despite Supreme Court precedent con-
struing the Fourth Amendment to the contrary). 
120. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975) (con-
cluding that the state court is the final arbiter of its own law and may freely inter-
pret that law in a manner more restrictive of the government than has the Supreme 
Court despite nearly identical language between the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and the cognate provision of the California 
Constitution). 
121. 314 Md. 1, 548 A.2d 506 (1988). 
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tion and article 21 of the Declaration of Rights. 122 
In analyzing the issue, the coart applied the two-part test an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington. 123 In 
Strickland, the Supreme Court approached the issue by granting great 
deference to trial counsel, with a concomitant refusal to use hindsight to 
conclude that tactical decisions that were unsuccessful demonstrated 
constitutionally inadequate performance. 124 The Strickland Court pro-
ceeded from this premise to hold that a defendant asserting ineffective 
assistance must establish both a deficiency in counsel's performance and 
resulting prejudice sufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, 
absent counsel's errors, the result of the case would have been 
different. 125 
In Colvin, the defense urged the court of appeals to reject Strickland 
and to hold trial counsel in capital cases to a higher standard. The court, 
however, was not persuaded. Citing Lodowski II, 126 it concluded that 
there is no distinction between the right to counsel provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment and article 21 and therefore, the Strickland standard ap-
plied to both. 127 
When the Supreme Court of Hawaii considered the same issue, it 
arrived at a different conclusion. In State v. Smith, 128 that court noted 
that the Strickland standard had been criticized because its prejudice 
component erected a nearly insuperable barrier to ineffective assistance 
claims. 129 It therefore rejected the prejudice requirement and held that 
under article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution it would continue 
to adhere to pre-Strickland Hawaii cases which focused upon counsel's 
performance rather than upon prejudice to the defense case. 130 
VI. CRITIQUE OF THE IN PARI MATERIA APPROACH 
· The foregoing discussion makes clear that state courts have divided 
on the question of whether their own constitutions should be applied so 
as to deviate from decisions of the Supreme Court with which they disa-
gree. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has firmly taken the position 
that Supreme Court precedent construing a provision of the United 
States Constitution is virtually direct authority for interpretation of the 
122. ld. at 23-24, 548 A.2d at 517; see also text accompanying notes 1-2. 
123. 466 u.s. 668 (1984). 
124. Id. at 689-91. 
125. Id. at 687. 
126. Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 513 A.2d 299 (1986); see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 32-33, 37. 
127. Colvin, 314 Md. at 24, 548 A.2d at 517. 
128. 712 P.2d 496 (Haw. 1986). 
129. I d. at 500 n. 7. 
130. ld. Similiarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has indicated that the 
Massachusetts Constitution may require a different standard than Strickland's. The 
court, however, found counsel's performance sufficiently competent that the matter 
could remain open. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 401 Mass. 627, 635, 519 N.E.2d 
245, 250 n.IO (1988). 
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cognate provision of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. As a result, a 
court which has not hesitated to render controversial decisions in favor 
of criminal defendants in other contexts131 has declined to deviate from 
federal precedent even where it is not persuaded that the particular hold-
ing is correct. The question that must be addressed is whether the in pari 
materia approach can be justified. 
In the course of a thorough analysis of the proper relationship be-
tween the United States Constitution and the constitutions of the states, 
one commentator has written: 
In our federal system, state constitutions have a significant role 
to play as protectors of individual rights and liberties. This role 
derives its character from the freedom of state courts to move 
beyond the protections provided by federal doctrine and from 
the distinctive character of state courts and state constitutions. 
But the state constitutional role is also shaped by the emer-
gence of the federal Bill of Rights in recent decades as the pri-
mary constitutional shield against intrusions by all levels of 
government. The present function of state constitutions is as a 
second line of defense for those rights protected by the federal 
Constitution and as an independent source of supplemental 
rights unrecognized by federallaw. 132 
This commentator further provided and elaborated upon specific 
justifications for rendering decisions under state charters that are incon-
sistent with Supreme Court precedent. In broad terms, these justifica-
tions are: (1) perceived flaws in the Supreme Court's reasoning which 
cause the state court to disagree with the result; (2) institutional differ-
ences between the state and federal governments; and (3) distinctive 
131. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979) (dismissal sanction for 
violation of 180-day "speedy trial" rule); Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 
709 (1978) (suppression of confession where a suspect's right to prompt presentment 
before a judicial officer is violated); Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 539 A.2d 637 
(1988) (death sentence); see also Huffington v. State, 295 Md. 1, 452 A.2d 1211 
(1982) (same). 
132. Comment, The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 
1324, 1367 (1982) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Comment, Interpretation of 
Rights]. This comment takes the position that state courts should show some defer-
renee to the Supreme Court in constitutional matters, should proceed carefully to 
fill in gaps left by Supreme Court decisions, and should carefully consider a number 
of factors before deviating from Supreme Court holdings. The commentators, how-
ever, reject the in pari materia approach: 
The duty to protect individual rights, a duty that both our federal struc-
ture and thei:· own constii:utions impose on the states, requires that state 
courts not regard their constitutions as mere mirrors of federal 
protections. 
/d. at 1356 (foomote omitted). See generally Collins, Galie & Kincaid, State High 
Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation since 1980: A Judicial 
Survey, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599 (1986); Symposium on the Revolution in 
State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 11 (1988); Symposium: The Emergence of 
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV. 959 (1985). 
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state-specific considerations such as the language of the state constitu-
tion, the state's history, established bodies of state law, and distinctive 
attitudes of the state's citizens.I33 
These factors weigh heavily in support of an interpretation of the 
Maryland Constitution which is independent of Supreme Court prece-
dent. As noted above, the court of appeals has at times found Supreme 
Court holdings unconvincing. The court of appeals was expressly dissat-
isfied by the reasoning of Burbine, 134 and perceived great force in the 
contention that the rule of Swain was outmoded. 135 By nevertheless fol-
lowing these holdings, the court has seemingly abdicated its frequently 
reiterated authority to give independent effect to the Maryland 
Constitution. 
Furthermore, the language of the relevant provisions of the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights differs significantly from that of the cognate 
federal provisions. For example, article 26 condemns improperly ob-
tained warrants as "grievous and oppressive" and as "illegal;" however, 
such terms do not appear in the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 136 Should the court of appeals desire to depart from the 
Supreme Court's view that a "good-faith" execution of an improper war-
rant is constitutionally valid, 137 the difference in language between the 
cognate provisions could provide a justification. 
More to the point, however, is the argument that the citizens of 
Maryland simply do not always share the prevailing views of the nation 
as a whole. For example, while the nation has elected conservative 
Republicans to the presidency in recent years, during the same period the 
governors, senators, and representatives elected by Maryland voters have 
overwhelmingly been affiliated with the Democratic Party. Any conten-
tion that the views of Supreme Court Justices appointed by Presidents 
Reagan and Bush more accurately reflect the views of Maryland citizens 
than do the ideas of court of appeals judges appointed by popularly-
elected governors of Maryland is dubious at best. Yet the practical effect 
of the in pari materia approach is to delegate to a conservative United 
States Supreme Court the task of construing the Maryland Constitution. 
An argument can be made, of course, that the in pari materia ap-
proach is appropriate. One possible benefit of the deference of a state 
court to Supreme Court precedent is the promotion of uniformity and 
predictability in the law. Given consistent deference, litigants or poten-
tial litigants can be confident that Supreme Court holdings will apply 
equally in the state courts and can govern themselves accordingly. 
Uniformity and consistency in the basic philosophical choices that 
give life to a constitution, however, would not appear to be appropriate 
133. Comment, Interpretation of Rights, supra note 132, at 1359-61. 
134. See supra notes 18-25, 31 and accompanying text. 
135. See supra notes 66-71, 96-98 and accompanying text. 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. 
137. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
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attributes of a federal system of government. The basic idea of federal-
ism is that local governments are to be motivated by local concerns, and 
are to enact, interpret, and enforce laws so as to best serve local needs. 
In contrast, the national government exists to discern a consensus or syn-
thesis from the variety of interests that motivate local governments, and 
to enact and interpret laws for the common good. The concerns of some 
localities in a diverse nation will frequently differ from those of other 
localities as well as from those of the nation as a whole. A significant 
shortcoming of the in pari materia approach is that instead of construing 
a state constitution to reflect local conditions and traditions, the task of 
interpretation is delegated to an authority whose views and concerns may 
be entirely different. Such an approach raises the real question of why it 
is necessary to have a state constitution at all. 138 
Another possible justification for the in pari materia idea is the one 
frequently expressed by the court of appeals - that the Federal Bill of 
Rights and Maryland Declaration of Rights emerged from the same his-
torical setting in response to the same problems. If social and economic 
conditions were static in nature, that justification might carry a substan-
tial amount of weight. It simply does not follow, however, that because 
two constitutional provisions were enacted in response to similar 
problems of the late eighteenth century, they should be construed in 
lockstep as courts face the very different concerns of the late twentieth 
century and beyond. While the drafters of the Fourth Amendment and 
article 26 may well have had similar views concerning the general war-
rants employed by the British government, for example, that sqrely does 
not bind their successors to think alike with regard to the propriety of 
such innovations as video surveillance within a suspect's home. 139 
Finally, the in pari materia approach disserves the goal of a wide 
dissemination of conflicting ideas, to the end that superior ideas will dis-
place outdated ones. The Supreme Court within its sphere may be 
supreme, but it is not infallible. In a system of checks and balances 
which provides few significant checks upon the nation's highest court, 
138. Along the same lines, the doctrine of stare decisis is not appropriately invoked as a 
justification for the granting of near-total deference. The Supreme Court has itself 
noted that when dealing with an issue that is "substantially related to the constitu-
tional sovereignty of the States," stare decisis plays a less important role than it does 
in other contexts. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 381 
(1977). Moreover, any actual reliance by a potential litigant upon the tendency of 
the court of appeals to follow Supreme Court precedent must be tempered by the 
former court's repeated pronouncement that the provisions of the State Constitution 
are "independent" and "capable of divergent effect." See supra note 4 and accom-
panying text. 
139. More logical seems the view of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts which 
justified the independence of the state charter in part on the basis that it is older 
than the United States Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 
476 N.E.2d 548 (1985); see also supra note 118 and accompanying text. When the 
Maryland Constitution was first enacted, the United States Constitution did not yet 
exist. See supra note 3. 
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the willingness of state courts to disagree under their own constitutions 
plays a vital role in the evolution of the rule of law in the United States. 
